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The notion that apparently healthy people can experience 
psychotic symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations “is 
now becoming the accepted dogma” (1). Part of this “dogma” 
is the assumption that the experiences reported by non-clin-
ical samples are overlapping, or at least show some similarity, 
with those reported by clinical samples (i.e., that “psychotic-
like experiences” exist on a continuum between general and 
clinical populations) (2).
In 1981, Launay and Slade (3) published the Launay-
Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS), a 12-item self-report 
questionnaire aimed to assess the prevalence of perceptual 
pathological experiences and sub-clinical forms related to 
hallucinations. This scale started a tradition of almost 30 
years of studies of hallucinations in non-clinical samples. 
Since then, several modified versions of LSHS have been 
developed (4-6). In order to assess in detail visual hallucina-
tions, Morrison et al (5) modified the LSHS excluding three 
original items and adding four new ones. This version of 
LSHS was called Revised Hallucination Scale (RHS) (Table 
1) and has been used in clinical and non-clinical samples 
(7,8). 
Although the LSHS and similar scales were constructed 
to measure predisposition to hallucinatory experiences (3) 
(i.e., the vulnerability phenotype and not the illness pheno-
type), subsequent studies have used the results obtained 
through these scales in non-clinical populations as the main 
argument suggesting that hallucinations – i.e., a significant 
component of the supposed illness phenotype of psychosis 
– are a relatively common phenomenon in the general popu-
lation. A very influential example of this trend is encapsu-
lated in the following quotation (9): “A number of studies 
have assessed hallucinatory experiences in samples of healthy 
college students using questionnaire measures. These studies 
have yielded consistent findings, showing that a considerable 
proportion of individuals experience hallucinations at some 
time in their lives”.
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Having identified the presence of hallucinations in non-
clinical samples, studies have started to explore the relation-
ships between these experiences and other psychological or 
psychopathological variables or domains such as anxiety, 
depression and stress (10), emotions (11), personality (12), 
and metacognition (13). Based on the analysis of these re-
sults, important theoretical assumptions have been made: a) 
that the same symptoms seen in patients with psychotic dis-
orders can be found and measured in non-clinical popula-
tions (2); b) that the clinical definition of psychosis may en-
compass only a minority of the whole (not necessarily clini-
cal) phenotypic continuum (9); c) that the population show-
ing a non-clinical psychosis phenotype may represent an 
appropriate group for studying the etiology of clinical psy-
chosis (13).
Despite the wide empirical evidence that a substantial 
proportion of the healthy general population has psychosis-
like experiences, virtually no studies have addressed whether 
Table 1  Items of the Revised Hallucinations Scale (RHS)
1. My thoughts seem as real as actual events in my life
2. No matter how much I try to concentrate on my work, unrelated 
thoughts always creep into my mind
3. I have had the experience of hearing a person’s voice and then found 
that there was no one there
4. The sounds I hear in my daydreams are usually clear and distinct
5. The people in my daydreams seem so true to life that I think they are 
real
6. In my daydreams I can hear the sound of a tune almost as clearly as if I 
were actually listening to it
7. I hear a voice speaking my thoughts aloud
8. I have been troubled by hearing voices in my head
9. I have seen a person’s face in front of me when no one was there
10. When I look at things they appear strange to me
11. I see shadows and shapes when there is nothing there
12. When I look at things, they look unreal to me
13. When I look at myself in the mirror I look different
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the experiences reported by non-clinical samples are indeed 
similar to the experiences of clinical samples. In other terms, 
if both populations respond positively to an item of the RHS, 
it is unclear whether they are referring to the same (or similar) 
experience. 
In the present study, we asked people who responded 
positively to items of the RHS to further comment on and 
describe their personal experiences related to those items, in 
order to characterize the quality of those experiences. The 
purpose was to assess the way individuals from non-clinical 
and clinical populations understand each RHS item and 
then compare the two populations looking for similarities 
and differences. 
Methods
We randomly selected a clinical and a non-clinical sample. 
The clinical sample consisted of 23 patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia according to DSM-IV-TR, recruited from day-
care hospitals of the National Health Care Service in the 
province of Almeria (Spain). Their age ranged from 21 to 63 
years; 73% were men and 27% women. All patients were 
born in Spain and unemployed, none was immigrant. All of 
them were receiving antipsychotic and/or antidepressant 
medication at the time of the assessment. The non-clinical 
sample included 60 university students from Southern Spain 
(Andalusia). Their age ranged from 17 to 29 years; 48% were 
men and 52% women. 
All participants completed the RHS as a self-questionnaire. 
When they responded positively to an RHS item, they were 
encouraged to provide further detailed descriptions, i.e., com-
ments or examples of their own experiences. The interviewers 
transcribed these responses verbatim.
Blinded to the sample to which each subject belonged, 
each researcher read the descriptions independently (line-
by-line examination of the data), seeking concepts and as-
signing them codes. Next, the descriptions were grouped ac-
cording to phenomenal analogies (e.g., dreams and dream-
like experiences), or similarities of the context in which the 
experiences had occurred (e.g., hypnagogic/hypnopompic 
states). The final categories were established by comparing, 
and discussing when necessary, each researcher’s coding. 
These categories were named using a comprehensive instru-
ment for psychopathological assessment (AMPD System) 
(14). Those descriptions which were not covered by an AM-
DP item were classified according to further psychopatho-
logical categories from a standard handbook of descriptive 
psychopathology (15).
The study protocol was approved by the Ethics Commit-
tees of the Hospital of Almeria and the Hospital of Poniente. 
Results
Prototypes of the descriptions given by the interviewees 
are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The types of descriptions 
provided by the two groups were remarkably different. For 
example, on items 3, 4, 8, 9, 12 (see Table 1), the non-clinical 
sample described hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucina-
tions (e.g., “I’m half asleep, not quite asleep nor fully awake, 
and I hear people calling me by name”), dreams and dream-
like experiences (e.g., “In my daydreaming I could see my 
father’s face”), and pseudo-hallucinations (e.g., “When I’m at 
home studying, I hear my mother’s voice calling me. She lives 
with me and calls me often, and this might make me think 
that I hear her calling me when she really is not”). On the 
contrary, on the same items, the clinical sample described 
Table 2  Prototypical descriptions of experiences provided by the clinical sample 
RHS items Categories Descriptions
1 Dereistic thinking I believe that my brother was dead when he was really alive
1, 3, 8, 10, 11 Centrality experiences Watching TV and thinking they were talking to me 
3, 7, 8 Auditory verbal hallucinations I hear a voice that asks me to do something or tells me something about someone 
3, 4, 5, 9 Visual hallucinations I see my mother or brother [as an apparition], and they show me their pain
6 Vivid imaginations I often only have to imagine the song and I hear it in my head with all of its instruments and parts 
2, 12 Obsessions-compulsions Sometimes I just attack people when I’m really a good person who hasn’t done
anything bad to anyone
10, 13 Derealization-depersonalization When looking at people, they sometimes seem strange, like they’re not real, and the things in the 
house too
4, 9, 11, 12 Tangential responses Listening to the song of Ana Belen, “...watching the time pass, the Gate of Alcalá”,
I’m from Madrid and it makes me cry because it brings back good memories of
my days as a student
2, 3, 5, 7, 13 Residual category Having tried to talk to the thought, thinking it was saying something. In that moment I thought I had 
power and that others were able to hear me [Thought transmission]
I imagined that another woman was me (that there was another woman inside of her) [Passivity 
experience]
RHS - Revised Hallucination Scale
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auditory verbal hallucinations (e.g., “I hear a voice that asks 
me to do something or tells me something about someone”), 
centrality experiences (e.g., “Watching TV and thinking they 
were talking to me”), and visual hallucinations (e.g., “I see 
my mother or brother [as an apparition], and they show me 
their pain”); or provided tangential responses (e.g., “Listen-
ing to the song of Ana Belen, ‘…watching the time pass, the 
Gate of Alcalá’. I’m from Madrid and it makes me cry, be-
cause it brings back good memories of my days as a student”). 
On RHS item 1 (“My thoughts seem as real as actual 
events in my life”), the non-clinical sample described experi-
ences classifiable as magical thinking (e.g., “Sometimes I 
imagine situations that I want to happen to me and they 
happen”), whereas the clinical sample described experiences 
reflecting dereistic thinking (e.g., “I believe that my brother 
was dead when he was really alive”). On RHS item 2 (“No 
matter how much I try to concentrate on my work, unrelated 
thoughts always creep into my mind”), the non-clinical sam-
ple described instances of thought interference (e.g., “When 
I try to study my course material, the constant fights with my 
partner come into my head”), whereas the clinical sample 
described obsessive-compulsive phenomena (e.g., “Some-
times I just attack people when I’m really a good person who 
hasn’t done anything bad to anyone”). 
On item 10 (“When I look at things they appear strange to 
me”), the non-clinical sample described experiences related 
to an attentive/reflexive process (e.g., “After observing the 
faces of people for a long time, I see them differently. What I 
mean is that they are not the way I thought they were be-
fore”), whereas the clinical sample described experiences of 
derealization (e.g., “When looking at people, they sometimes 
seem strange, like they’re not real, and the things in the house 
too”). 
On item 11 (“I see shadows and shapes where there is 
nothing there”), the non-clinical sample described affective 
illusions (e.g., “When I’m in bed and alone at home, I see 
shadows on the walls and then I realize that it’s the light from 
the street coming through the window”), whereas the clinical 
sample reported centrality experiences (e.g., “I realize that 
they were there for me”).
Only on item 6 (“In my daydreams I can hear the sound 
of a tune almost as clearly as if I were actually listening to it”), 
the two groups provided overlapping descriptions of experi-
ences related to vivid imagination (e.g., in the non-clinical 
sample, “When I really like a song, I can listen to it without 
needing to hear it in reality”, and in the clinical sample, “I 
often only have to imagine the song and I hear it in my head 
with all of its instruments and parts”).
discussion
Our results show that people with schizophrenia and 
healthy university students endorsing RHS items provide 
very different descriptions of their experiences. What is dif-
ferent is the personal quality of these experiences. 
Hallucinatory or hallucinatory-like experiences cannot be 
reliably and validly assessed only as a matter of frequency or 
intensity. Their assessment requires a precise characteriza-
tion of the phenomenal quality of the experience. A very im-
Table 3  Prototypical descriptions of experiences provided by the non-clinical sample 
RHS items Categories Descriptions
1, 4, 5, 8, 9 Dreams and dream-like  
experiences
In my daydreaming I could see my father’s face
3, 4, 8, 9 Hypnagogic and hypnopompic  
hallucinations
I’m half asleep, not quite asleep nor fully awake, and I hear people calling me by name
3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12 Pseudo-hallucinations When I’m at home studying, I hear my mother’s voice calling me. She lives with me and calls me  
often, and this might make me think that I hear her calling me when she really is not
4, 5, 6 Vivid imaginations When I really like a song, I can listen to it without needing to hear it in reality
1 Magical thinking Sometimes I imagine situations that I want to happen to me and they happen
2 Thoughts interference When I try to study my course material, the constant fights with my partner come into my head
2 Distraction I have problems at home and I’m having a hard time concentrating on my studies
10, 12 Attentive/reflexive processes After observing the faces of people for a long time, I see them differently. What I mean is that they  
are not the way I thought they were before
13 Mood fluctuations There are days that I’m more energetic, and I look prettier because I don’t see the wrinkles around 
my eyes and other days when I say “Today I would not even walk out the front door”
11 Affective illusions When I’m in bed and alone at home, I see shadows on the walls and then I realize that it’s the light 
from the street coming through the window
8, 12 Residual category When I am very nervous, sometimes people and what they are doing and everything stop making 
sense and it seems like they are “a joke” [Derealization]
When I have a slight fever, I hear voices. As a child this happened to me quite often [Organic  
hallucination]
RHS - Revised Hallucination Scale
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portant difference between our two samples was that, in pa-
tients with schizophrenia, the experiences were intimately 
related to the person’s identity, with enduring anomalies in 
their sense of self and with a characteristic metamorphosis of 
the self-world relationship (16-18), while in the non-clinical 
group they were related to a circumstantial event (e.g., a situ-
ation of mourning), or were reported as a single or isolated 
phenomenon. 
As recently argued by Kendler (19), psychopathological as-
sessment should neither be confined to determining the pres-
ence or absence of a given symptom, nor should it simply fo-
cus on surface symptoms picked for their reliability. Rather, it 
should look for deeper phenomena which may emerge only 
from careful phenomenological analysis. 
The results of this study suggest that it is not advisable to 
analyze and study hallucinations, especially in non-clinical 
populations, using research protocols based solely on yes-or-
no answers to questionnaires. This is not to deny the impor-
tance of studies on hallucinations in non-psychotic persons 
or the presence of hallucinations in normal population, but 
rather to challenge the kind of methodology used to date to 
assess this phenomenon. The issue addressed by this paper 
is the importance of the quality of such experiences, and 
what makes them similar or radically different from those in 
persons with schizophrenia. 
We need an in-depth, fine-tuned characterization of the 
phenomenal quality of abnormal perceptual experiences, in-
cluding hallucinations. This characterization can avoid diag-
nostic mistakes, e.g., overdiagnosis of schizophrenia, as well 
as the development of unreliable models of the pathogenesis 
of hallucinations based on an inaccurate assessment of ab-
normal perceptual experiences in non-clinical populations. 
Without such an effort to phenomenologically characterize 
normal as well as abnormal experiences, any attempt at a 
comparison is at risk of leading to non-informative conclu-
sions (20). 
A limitation of this study is that the non-clinical sample 
was made up only of students and cannot be considered rep-
resentative of the general population. In addition, the details 
provided by the participants must be understood within the 
specific Spanish cultural context. In future research, it would 
be of interest to compare these results with those obtained in 
samples from other cultures, as well as in different clinical 
(e.g., manic-depressive) and non-clinical (e.g., adult general 
population) samples. 
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